Platform verification
How an Advanced game checks a player's TPM 2.0, Secure Boot, memory integrity and IOMMU state: what is verified and from what, what a player sees, and what it cannot tell you.
Read this first. This is built and works end to end, but it is not released. It has run on one PC. The client is unsigned. A TPM is accepted only through its manufacturer's certificate, and for TPMs that do not carry one (AMD's firmware TPMs, for example) the service has to be allowed to fetch it from the manufacturer. The "on" results for memory integrity and IOMMU have been tested with constructed boot records, not on a PC that has them on. Verify on your own hardware before you require any of it of players.
Why not just ask the PC
A client that reports "TPM present, Secure Boot on" has proved nothing: it runs on a machine the player controls. The service instead asks the PC's TPM a question only a real TPM can answer, and reads the boot state from a record the TPM vouches for.
What is verified, and from what
| Requirement | Evidence | Tested on real hardware |
|---|---|---|
| TPM 2.0 | A quote of this boot's measurements over a single-use challenge, authenticated to a TPM whose endorsement key a recognised manufacturer certified. | Yes, on one AMD firmware TPM, verified through AMD's certificate for it. Other makers' TPMs: constructed evidence only. |
| UEFI Secure Boot | The firmware's own measurement of its SecureBoot variable, the first entry of its kind in PCR 7, before the firmware's separator. | "On": yes. "Off": constructed records only. |
| Memory integrity (HVCI) | Windows' boot record in PCRs 12 and 13: hypervisor and secure kernel started, no hypervisor failure, and the code-integrity policy enabled. Believed only when Secure Boot is on, because otherwise an unsigned boot loader could have written the record. | "Off": yes. "On": constructed records only. |
| IOMMU DMA protection | The same record: virtualization-based security was started with the IOMMU required, the event Microsoft's published attestation policy uses. | "Off": yes. "On": constructed records only. |
Every event the verdict rests on has to hash to the value that replays to the TPM's quoted PCR, and anything added to a PCR after Windows closed it is ignored. A boot log that tells a better story than the PC's real boot does not replay and is rejected.
The exchange
The client SDK does this inside obs_start_session. On the PC it was measured on it added well under a second.
- The session is created but not admitted: the answer is
attestation_requiredwith a challenge. No join token is issued while it waits. - The SDK sends the TPM's public endorsement key. The service returns a random salt encrypted to that key.
- The SDK creates a temporary attestation key in the TPM, starts a TPM session with the encrypted salt, and sends the key's public part. Only the TPM holding the endorsement key can turn that salt into the session's key. The service returns an authorization for exactly one quote.
- The TPM produces the quote and authenticates its answer with the session key. The SDK sends it with the PCR values and Windows' boot log.
- The service checks all of it and answers with the admission decision.
The SDK needs no administrator rights, installs nothing, leaves nothing in the TPM or on disk, and never changes firmware, boot, virtualization or Windows security settings.
Results
Each requirement gets its own result. Your game server sees them in platform on session verification, and the console shows them per session.
| Result | Meaning |
|---|---|
satisfied | Verified from evidence. |
feature_disabled | The evidence shows it is off, or (for a TPM) the PC reports it is not ready. |
hardware_unsupported | The PC reports no TPM, or a TPM older than 2.0. |
os_unsupported | The Windows version cannot provide the evidence. |
verification_unavailable | It could not be checked: for example the TPM's manufacturer is not recognised by the service, or the item depends on another that was not verified. |
evidence_invalid | Evidence was sent and did not verify. |
What the player sees
In Enforce mode a session that does not meet a required item is refused with platform_requirement_not_met, category compatibility. The message names the first unmet item and says what the player can change, for example how to turn on Secure Boot. It always states that this is not a finding about them or their account.
A platform result is never a detection, never a restriction and never an accusation, including when evidence fails to verify. Nothing here feeds the detectors.
In Monitor mode (development only) sessions are admitted and the results are recorded, so you can see what share of your testers would pass before you enforce anything.
Choosing what to require
- Each of the four items has its own switch per game. Secure Boot, memory integrity and IOMMU need TPM attestation on; memory integrity and IOMMU also need Secure Boot on.
- Windows records the IOMMU requirement as a policy that many home PCs do not set. Expect a large share of players to fail it.
- Changing a switch applies to running sessions at their next heartbeat, using the evidence already held.
What it does not show
- Boot-time state only. It describes how the PC started, not what is running now.
- Not that the TPM is in the PC playing. Evidence can be relayed from another PC that meets the requirements.
- Not against physical or firmware attacks. Published attacks exist on firmware TPMs and on the bus of discrete TPMs, and firmware that lies about its own measurements defeats this.
- Not that a cheat is absent. A PC can meet all four requirements and still run one.
For operators of the service
- Manufacturer certificates. Put the TPM manufacturers' CA certificates in the directory named by
OBSCURITY_ATTESTATION_ROOTS_DIR. Microsoft publishes them asTrustedTpm.cab. With none installed, every TPM is reported asverification_unavailable. - TPMs without a stored certificate. AMD firmware TPMs and some Intel ones keep no certificate in the TPM.
OBSCURITY_ATTESTATION_EK_LOOKUP=truelets the service fetch it from the manufacturer, which sends that manufacturer a hash of the player's endorsement key. It is off by default. AMD's service has been exercised from a development server and answered as expected. Intel's follows the scheme of two open-source tools and has not been tried, because no Intel PC has been available. - Your own test PCs.
python -m obscurity attestation-statusprints the endorsement-key name of the PC it runs on. Listing names inOBSCURITY_ATTESTATION_DEV_TRUSTED_EKStrusts those PCs without a certificate. The setting is refused in production.
What is collected
| Data | Purpose | Kept |
|---|---|---|
| The public half of the TPM's endorsement key, and its certificate if the TPM stores one | Tie the TPM's answer to one TPM and check that a TPM manufacturer certified it. The key identifies the PC's TPM, so it is treated as personal data. | Not kept. A hash of the key salted with the game's id is kept with the session: it lets that one game recognise a PC it has seen and cannot be matched across games or studios. |
| A TPM quote of this boot's measurements, and the measured values (PCRs 0-7 and 11-14) | The TPM's authenticated statement of how the PC booted, bound to a single-use server challenge. | Not kept. |
| Windows' measured-boot log for the current boot | Read whether Secure Boot, memory integrity and the IOMMU requirement were on when Windows started. The log lists the firmware and boot components that started. It holds no documents, messages, browsing data or credentials. | Not kept. It is discarded when the check ends. |
| The TPM's four-character manufacturer id | Decide which manufacturer's certificate applies. | The manufacturer named in the certificate is kept with the session. |
| The result for each requirement, the reason, and a few values read from the boot record (for example: Secure Boot on, hypervisor started, test signing off) | The admission decision, the advice shown to the player, and the studio's view of why sessions are refused. | Kept with the session for the retention period of the game's tier. |