Platform security requirements
How the four platform requirements of the Advanced and Elite tiers are verified, what the evidence proves, and what still depends on information reported by the client. Core imposes none of them.
Built, not released. Verification works end to end and has run on one PC; see platform verification for what is built and how it was tested. Items marked to validate below have not been confirmed on real hardware.
Why not just ask the client?
Windows exposes all four states to ordinary programs, and a client could report four booleans. A modified client could report anything. Verification therefore rests on TPM remote attestation: the firmware and Windows record ("measure") security-relevant boot events into the TPM, and the TPM states those measurements in a form the server can authenticate.
Evidence
- Endorsement key. Every TPM has one, and its manufacturer certifies it. The certificate must chain to a manufacturer certificate the service trusts.
- A session only that TPM can key. The server encrypts a random salt to the endorsement key. Only the TPM that owns the key can derive the session's key from it. This needs no administrator rights on the PC; the usual alternative (credential activation) is blocked by Windows for ordinary user accounts.
- Quote. For each session the TPM states the current values of its platform configuration registers together with a fresh server challenge, and authenticates the answer with that session key.
- Measured-boot log. The client sends the log of boot events. The server replays the log and requires the result to equal the quoted register values, then reads the security state from the log's events.
The five questions, per requirement
| Requirement | Hardware capability | Configuration | Active state | Remotely verifiable | Client-reported only |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TPM 2.0 | A TPM implementing specification version 2.0. | Enabled in firmware and provisioned by Windows. | It can create an attestation key and produce a quote. | Quote signature; endorsement certificate chain; key certification. | Firmware version and vendor strings (diagnostics). |
| Secure Boot | UEFI firmware with Secure Boot. | Secure Boot switched on with keys enrolled. | Firmware measured the SecureBoot variable as enabled during this boot. |
That measurement is in the log and covered by the signed register 7. | The registry flag Windows exposes (diagnostics, mismatch detection). |
| HVCI | Virtualization extensions with second-level address translation. | Memory integrity turned on; boot drivers compatible. | Windows launched its hypervisor with the code-integrity policy enabled this boot. | Windows' own boot events for virtualization-based security and HVCI policy in the log. To validate: the "on" encoding on a PC with memory integrity on. | The live kernel code-integrity flags (diagnostics, mismatch detection). |
| IOMMU | Intel VT-d or AMD-Vi. | Enabled in firmware. | Windows started virtualization-based security with the IOMMU required this boot. | Windows' boot event recording that requirement, the one Microsoft's published attestation policy reads. To validate: on a PC that has it on, and across vendors. | Kernel DMA Protection policy state; presence of the firmware's IOMMU tables. |
The IOMMU requirement, precisely
"IOMMU protection" is satisfied when Windows' boot record shows virtualization-based security was started with the IOMMU required for DMA protection. That is stricter than "the IOMMU exists and is enabled": Windows records it as a policy, and on many home PCs the policy is not set even when VT-d or AMD-Vi and memory integrity are on. Expect a large share of players to fail this item, and treat it as optional until you have measured it on your own audience.
We record but do not require Windows' separate Kernel DMA Protection feature. Microsoft documents it as a platform feature that must be supported when the PC is manufactured and cannot be enabled by the end user, so requiring it would exclude many otherwise compliant desktop PCs for a reason their owners cannot fix.
The limit is important: with the IOMMU protecting the hypervisor, devices still have the same access as the normal Windows kernel. The requirement protects the integrity of the security boundary; it does not by itself stop a hardware device from reading game memory.
Freshness, replay and session binding
- Every quote includes a random server challenge that is single-use and expires quickly. A recorded quote is rejected as stale.
- The challenge is derived together with the session's own key, so a quote produced for one session cannot be presented in another.
- The log must replay exactly to the quoted register values. A log that has been edited does not.
- Evidence is collected once, when the session starts. It is judged again at every heartbeat against the game's current policy, but it is not collected again during a session.
What this does not prove
- Boot time, not run time. The evidence describes how the PC started. It does not describe software loaded later.
- Which machine. A valid quote proves a genuine TPM signed it, not that the TPM is in the PC running the game. Session binding raises the cost of relaying evidence from another machine; it does not eliminate it.
- TPM weaknesses. Firmware TPMs and the buses of discrete TPMs have published attacks. Evidence from a compromised TPM can be false.
- Missing certificates. Some TPMs ship without an endorsement certificate or need it fetched from the manufacturer. Those PCs return
verification_unavailable, not a failure of the feature itself. - Virtual machines. A virtual TPM has no manufacturer-issued certificate and cannot satisfy the policy.
Results and admission
Each requirement yields one result: satisfied, feature_disabled, hardware_unsupported, os_unsupported, verification_unavailable, evidence_invalid or service_unavailable. The player-facing table explains each.
Under an enforcing policy a protected session starts only when every item the game has switched on is satisfied. Under a monitoring policy, available only while a game is in development, results are recorded and never block. A new session always answers a new challenge.
A failed platform requirement is a compatibility outcome. It is stored separately from detections and can never, on its own, become a penalty.
What the client changes on a PC
Nothing. The SDK reads state and asks the TPM for a quote, using a key that exists only for that run; it needs no administrator rights and does not alter firmware, boot configuration, virtualization, disk encryption or Windows security settings.